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EVENTS IN VICHY THROW NEW LIGHT ON EUROPE'S UNDERGROUND

MARSHAL PETAIN'S futile attempt on November 18 to defy his Nazi overlords—by delivering a radio speech recognizing the National Assembly's authority in the event of his death before promulgation of a new constitution—clearly indicates the way the political wind is blowing in France. The Chief of State's bid for Allied support abroad and de Gaullist sympathy at home also testifies to the effectiveness of the Allies' war of nerves against Axis-held Europe on the eve of the grand assault against the continent. Like the Nazi soldiers and officials who, it is reported, are attempting to secure affidavits from people within the occupied countries stating that their past behavior has been exemplary, Pétain is trying to prepare for the day of reckoning.

FRENCH UNDERGROUND REJECTS MOVE.

His efforts appear doomed to failure, however, for Vichy has little to contribute to the deliverance of France, and the good will of the French people will not be carried by a last-minute conversion. As early as August, the important French underground newspaper *Resistance* foresaw the present attempted shift on the part of Pétain. It warned that he and other Nazi-collaborators were scheming to make Laval the scapegoat for the Vichy régime and insure their own escape from punishment by creating the impression that they favored restoration of democratic government at the first opportunity. But, as this journal concluded, "Frenchmen will not be caught in this snare. Men who engineered the defeat cannot claim to be the saviors who will rescue France from traitors."

Pétain's belated effort to recognize democratic institutions also indicates the present strength of the underground movement in France. The organizations of resistance began to take form in the autumn of 1940, when small groups in occupied France tried to communicate with relatives and friends in the unoccupied zone, and to do what they could to hinder the Nazis. The underground movement has grown

with each indication that the German armistice terms were far harsher than the Vichy government originally claimed. And after Laval announced in the summer of 1942 that Frenchmen would be sent to work in Germany, it expanded rapidly. The liberation of Corsica and other Allied successes in the Mediterranean during the past three months further encouraged its development into a force that is now strong enough to rock Pétain's confidence in his régime.

NEW LEADERS FOR EUROPE. Elsewhere in Europe similar signs of vigorous resistance to the Nazis point to the existence of groups which will figure importantly in the future of Europe. Within the various occupied countries, underground movements have produced leaders who will continue to play dominant roles following liberation of their nations. Although the names of these men and women are almost entirely unknown to us now, since their safety and present effectiveness require anonymity, there is abundant evidence from the underground press and witnesses who have escaped from Europe that these new leaders enjoy widespread popular confidence and will command positions of responsibility in Europe's post-war political life.

Even more important than this supply of new leadership within the Axis-occupied countries is the reservoir of ideas concerning the future that the underground movements have created. To be sure, the elaborate post-war planning that flourishes in the United States is a luxury which Europe's underground leaders cannot afford because of their preoccupation with resistance to the Nazis. Since plans for war and peace are closely linked, however, and because hopes for a better future help keep resistance to the Axis at high pitch, some underground discussion of post-war goals has been carried on since the beginning of Axis occupation. And in recent months belief in the possibility of early liberation has stimulated additional discussion of the complicated prob-

lems to be faced in Europe after victory is won.

NO RETURN TO NORMALCY. Despite the inevitable differences in points of view among the underground movements of the various occupied countries, unanimity exists on one point—that there shall be no return to “normalcy,” for pre-war conditions led in each country only to Axis conquest and succeeding years of privation and suffering. There is, however, a marked contrast between the aspirations of the resistance movements of those countries which had arrived at fairly satisfactory solutions to their political and economic problems in the pre-war period, and those which had not. Whereas the underground in Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands stresses the extension of pre-war legislation providing for improved housing, better educational opportunities and greater social security for workers, leaders of resistance in other countries tend to advocate more far-reaching changes.

In France there is general agreement that the Third Republic is dead and must be replaced by a Fourth Republic, characterized not only by greater political stability but by economic reforms which will improve the lot of the workers and end the control of great wealth by small groups. In Poland, Yugoslavia and Greece, opposition groups which were almost entirely silenced before the war by the semi-fascist régimes of their countries are now urging thoroughgoing political and economic changes. In Poland, the emphasis rests on establishment of truly representative government and more equitable distribution of land and other forms of natural wealth. In Greece, the problem of whether the government should be a

monarchy or a republic is foremost owing to distrust of the King engendered by his acquiescence in the pre-war dictatorship. And the goal of the Yugoslav underground appears to be replacement of pre-war Serbian domination by a genuine federation of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

ROLE OF THE BIG THREE. In view of strong internal minority opposition in some countries to these programs of reform, it would be Utopian to believe that the underground movements' projected changes can be realized without generating friction. But whether this friction reaches its maximum or minimum proportions depends largely on the attitude the Big Three take toward Europe. If, as a means of maintaining their own safety, the Anglo-American bloc follows the balance of power policy and the U.S.S.R. attempts to secure spheres of influence in Europe, the Big Three will tend to intervene within the liberated countries to improve their own positions on the continent. Under these circumstances the tangled Yugoslav question, for example, could become a testing-ground for the great powers, with the U.S.S.R. and the Anglo-American bloc supporting rival groups and ignoring the wishes of the Yugoslavs. On the other hand, if the Big Three proceed to develop the framework of cooperation outlined by the Moscow Conference and look toward a system of collective security to guarantee their interests, the underground leaders will be assured far greater freedom in carrying out their proposed plans for the reconstruction of their nations.

WINIFRED N. HADSEL

ELECTIONS TO BE TOUCHSTONE OF BOLIVIAN DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

MEXICO CITY.—Political activity in Bolivia has increased considerably in the past few weeks and will continue to do so until next year, when the Presidential election campaign, scheduled for March-May, will be in full swing.

President Enrique Peñaranda del Castillo—in office since 1940, when he was elected to succeed the late German Busch by a vote of 75,000 to 15,000 over his Leftist opponent, José Antonio Arze—cannot be immediately reelected according to the Bolivian Constitution. Preliminary consultations as to a new President are already under way at La Paz, and the question dominating discussions is: “Will the elections be really free, or will the President impose a successor of his own choice?”

PRESENT POLITICAL SET-UP. Bolivia's population totals about 3,500,000 people, but only those who can read and write may take part in the elections. As illiterate and desperately poor Indians constitute over 80 per cent of the population, the number of voters is comparatively small. Moreover, they are so divided along political and ideological lines

that coalition governments are inevitable, since no single party is ever able to take power alone. At present, there are six important political parties in the country, three of which (Republican, Genuine Republican, and Republican Socialist—this latter socialist in name only) are generally considered conservative. The other three (Nationalist Revolutionary, Unified Socialist, and Revolutionary Left) are, in varying degrees, Leftist. The Bolivian Congress is composed of a Senate of 28 members, in which representatives of the conservative parties are in an overwhelming majority, and a House of Representatives of 110 members in which the Right and Left are about equally represented.

PRELIMINARY SKIRMISHES. The political ball for the coming Presidential, as well as Congressional, elections started to roll last month, when President Peñaranda called in the leaders of the four “traditional” parties (those listed above, minus the Nationalist Revolutionary and Revolutionary Left), and asked them to accept a candidate of his choice, to be selected later. Friends of the administration hailed

General Peñaranda's move as one in favor of unity and peace. Opponents, particularly members of the two parties not consulted, declared the measure was designed to deprive them of the right to present a candidate. The consultation and bargaining now going on will probably last many weeks and, if the President succeeds in persuading the four traditional parties to back his plan, the minorities may be forced to accept his candidate.

During an official visit to the United States in May 1943 President Peñaranda, according to reliable sources, was advised in high places to grant greater political freedom to opposition parties. Five months earlier, Secretary of the Interior Pedro Zilveti Arce ordered Bolivian troops to fire ruthlessly on a group of workers who had gone on strike for a wage increase at Catavi, one of Bolivian tin-king Patino's fiefs. This aroused so much protest all over America that a commission of inquiry was sent to Bolivia in February 1943. In the recent Cabinet shake-up, however, Secretary Zilveti was confirmed by President Peñaranda in his post. Nevertheless the situation in Bolivia seems to have somewhat improved. While in the United States, President Peñaranda received José Antonio Arze, exiled leader of the Revolutionary Left party, and formally promised that he might return to Bolivia and be free to resume his political activity. This and other facts have raised great hopes for a more effective democracy in the near future. The coming months will show whether these hopes are justified.

BOLIVIA'S ECONOMIC PLIGHT. Like most Latin American countries, Bolivia since Pearl Harbor has been suffering from an excess of paper currency in circulation—the result of increased wartime exports of strategic materials and decreased imports of machinery and other needed commodities. The inflation created by this state of affairs is greater by far in Bolivia than in any other Latin American country.

For a survey of the post-war objectives of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Yugoslavia, READ:

POST-WAR PROGRAMS OF EUROPE'S UNDERGROUND

by Winifred N. Hadsel

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November 15 issue of FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS
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According to statistics of both the Bolivian Bank of Issue and the League of Nations, Bolivia occupies the unenviable position of being the Western Hemisphere country in which the cost of living has increased most since the war. The cost-of-living index established by the Bolivian Central Bank reached 701 at the end of 1942 (1936=100), representing a level seven times higher than seven years before. From January to December 1942 alone, the index went from 555 to 701. This goes far to explain the unrest among salaried people in Bolivia, whose wages buy less and less every month, and who must constantly battle to secure at least partially compensating wage increases.

ERNEST S. HEDIGER

Is China a Democracy? by Creighton Lacy. New York, John Day, 1943. \$1.50

Although granting that China is not democratic in the sense of having universal suffrage or representative government, the author believes that the spirit and people of China are democratic and that a new China is being built in the course of the war.

American Diplomacy in the Far East: 1941, compiled with a foreword by K. C. Li. New York, K. C. Li, Woolworth Building, 1942. \$3.00

A collection of documents, consisting chiefly of official press releases of the Department of State.

The Goebbels Experiment, by Derrick Sington and Arthur Weidenfeld. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1943. \$3.00

Matter-of-fact description of Nazi efforts to control the minds of Germans and their conquered peoples. Adds little to previous accounts.

Greek Miracle, by Stephen Lavra. New York, Hastings House, 1943. \$1.50

Short account of Greek resistance to the Nazis which the author thinks kept them from advancing further in the Near East.

Pacific Blackout, by John McCutcheon Raleigh. New York, Dodd, Mead, 1943. \$2.50

A journalist's report on the fall of the Netherlands East Indies, together with several chapters on Australia. Interesting, but superficial and lacking in detail.

Exchange Ship, by Max Hill. New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1942. \$2.50

The former Chief of Bureau of the Associated Press in Tokyo describes his experiences in Japan before Pearl Harbor, his imprisonment by the Japanese and his return on the *Asama Maru* and *Gripsholm* in the summer of 1942.


Malta Magnificent, by Major Francis W. Gerard. New York, Whittlesey House, 1943. \$2.50

With warm admiration for the people who went through a literal hell of bombing, Major Gerard describes his two years as Information Officer on Malta. He regards the island as having "held in her slim hands the destiny of the United Nations."

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Washington News Letter



Nov. 22.—Rumania seems destined to be the first Axis satellite country to fall to the United Nations. It is shaken by the approach of the Soviet armies through the Ukraine toward the Dniester river; by the recent bombings of the Rumanian Ploesti oil fields and of Sofia, the Bulgarian capital a few miles south of Rumania; and by the prospect of Turkish entrance into the war or, at least, Turkish authorization to send Russia-bound Allied supply ships through the Straits into the Black Sea. Even before the Sofia bombings, General Ion Antonescu, Rumanian dictator, conferred with Adolf Hitler and reportedly sued for permission to withdraw most of the Rumanian troops from Russia. And last week it was reported from Ankara and Berne that Rumanian owners of merchandise are selling in panicky anticipation of the country's collapse.

CAROL'S CAMPAIGN. This prospect raises a strange political problem for the United States. Carol Hohenzollern, who abdicated on September 5, 1940 and now lives in exile in Mexico City, has hired an American press agent, Russell Birdwell, to convince the American people that Rumania wants Carol to return as king; his son Mihai now rules. The Columbia Broadcasting System has agreed to let Carol tell his story in a nationwide broadcast, and a number of newspapers, inspired by Mr. Birdwell, are pleading the king's cause. The campaign is intended to reach its climax about the time of Rumania's defeat.

The aim of this publicity is, of course, to arouse Americans to press for government assistance to Carol. Since the ex-king reached Mexico in July 1941, the State Department has steadfastly refused to grant him a visa to enter the United States. On January 7, 1942 Carol announced that he had organized a "Free Rumania" movement with himself at its head, and Leon Fischer, of New York City, a sort of precursor to Mr. Birdwell, issued statements to the American press. On February 12, 1942 Washington discouraged the movement; Sumner Welles, then Acting Secretary of State, said that the presence of Carol in this country would not be conducive to the war effort of the United States nor to the kind of national unity we want during the war.

The Birdwell undertaking, which marks the first time an ex-king has sought through press agency to regain his kingdom, is embarrassing to the United States government, but any possibility that it will change its attitude toward Carol is remote. In the first place, decisions about Carol's future will come

not from this country alone but from the United States in company with its Allies and the Rumanian people, and no statement from Russia or Britain indicates sympathy with Carol's hopes. In the second place, this government desires the United Nations to be in a position to take full advantage of Rumania's fall when it comes; for us to raise the issue of Carol would only confuse the war in the Balkans.

INSIDE RUMANIA. The prospect is slight of an internal crack-up in Rumania before the arrival of enemy troops at its frontier—considering that frontier as the Pruth river line fixed in June 1940 when the U.S.S.R. annexed Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. The great majority of Rumanians are united in fear and dislike of Russia, and German soldiers now police Rumania. Nazi Minister von Killinger in Bucharest dictates to Dictator Antonescu, who has lost all his following in the country. Rumania supported Antonescu when he joined Germany in the war against Russia in order to regain Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, but interest in the war disappeared when Rumanian troops crossed the Bessarabian boundary and invaded the Ukraine. Recent Rumanian defeats during the Red Army advance have made Antonescu intensely unpopular.

Juliu Maniu, leader of the Peasant party, is first in popularity among Rumanian public men. This fact speaks well for Rumanian thought, for Maniu—a more than technically able politician—stands for the idea of freedom and democracy. Once Prime Minister before Carol became king, Maniu never formed a government under Carol; and during the past three years Antonescu's police have kept him under close watch. What régime the Russians favor in Rumania is unknown. But it is interesting that last year Charles Davila, former Rumanian Minister in Washington, who speaks in behalf of Maniu in the United States, attempted to establish a basis of Rumanian-Russian rapport in a series of conversations with Maxim Litvinov, then Soviet Ambassador to the United States.

There is also the possibility that war may break out between Rumania and Hungary before Russian troops reach the Balkans. Rumanian speeches, radio broadcasts, and newspaper articles reflect an intensifying determination to retake the half of Transylvania transferred to Hungary by the Vienna Award of August 30, 1940. Such an outbreak would speed Rumanian collapse, and collapse will disclose the extent of Carol's political strength in his own country.

BLAIR BOLLES

1918—TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE F.P.A.—1943